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Risk assessment, policy-making and the limits of knowledge: the 
precautionary principle and international relations. 
Craig McLean, Alan Patterson and John Williams * 
Abstract 
This paper looks at the way in which the idea of the Precautionary Principle, 
increasingly influential in environmental and other policy areas, is being and 
might be used in foreign and security policy. It aims to contrast the relative 
precision with which the term is used in the environmental arena with the current 
usage in international relations. Contrasting the Precautionary Principle with 
ideas of precaution, prevention, pre-emption and similar terms in post-
structuralist analyses of risk, humanitarian intervention and US foreign-policy in 
the aftermath of September 11th 2001, the paper identifies costs and benefits in 
deploying a more carefully specified account of the Precautionary Principle. In 
particular, it highlights key issues of regulatory authority and the way in which 
policy-makers and analysts understand and respond to the limits of knowledge 
and knowledge-systems as important challenges to which careful use of the 
Precautionary Principle can potentially contribute. The paper concludes by 
suggesting that both policy-making and policy analysis could potentially be 
improved by adapting and extending the idea of the Precautionary Principle as it 
is deployed in other policy arenas. 
 
Key words: hazard, precaution, Precautionary Principle, risk, security, Iraq war, 
Just War, governmentality 
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Introduction 
The language of foreign policy has been significantly altered since the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Led by the Bush 
Administration‟s much analysed, debated and critiqued National Security 
Strategies of 2002 and 2006, the issues of regime change and preventive war (or 
preemptive war in the terms of the National Security Strategy) have driven the 
idea that attaining national security in the face of terrorism requires innovative 
techniques.1 The use of enhanced interrogation techniques (or torture in plain 
terms) and „extraordinary rendition‟ have reinforced the argument that a changed 
security situation and different sort of security threat demand a move away from 
previously proscribed practices.2  
What holds these different instances of those arguments for innovation together 
is the idea of anticipatory action, sometimes labelled „precaution‟.3 In order for 
the US government (although the argument ought, in theory anyway, to hold for 
any other government) to fulfil its fundamental „obligation‟ to provide for the 
security of its citizens in changed circumstances action must be taken in advance 
of threats becoming fully formed and indisputably apparent.4 Whether that be 
overthrowing governments suspected of planning to acquire nuclear weapons, or 
striking terrorist organisations planning further mass-casualty attacks or, at its 
most threatening, a proliferating government willing and able to assist a terrorist 
organisation, the gathering of intelligence information and the snuffing out of 
plots must take place at the earliest possible opportunity.5 
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The idea of anticipatory action in advance of complete knowledge of either the 
consequences or likelihood of a particular course of action has generated a great 
deal of political and academic debate and discussion, and in realms well beyond 
the foreign policy of the United States. Ideas of hazard, risk and precaution are, 
indeed, embedded in the legal, institutional and regulatory practices of policy-
making in areas such as environmental and public health policy, in particular via 
the „Precautionary Principle‟ (PP). In these arenas, these terms have acquired, 
over three decades or so of debate, advocacy and implementation, a 
comparative precision of meaning and rigour of use that is in contrast to the way 
such terms are generally deployed across accounts of foreign policy-making and 
analysis.  
Specifically, this paper aims to look at the way that current discussion of risk and 
the Precautionary Principle confuse a number of separable ideas and draw their 
power from different intellectual backgrounds and approaches. There is, for 
example, a lack of careful differentiation between hazard and risk that tends to 
blur the physical, measurable and predictable with the social, subjective and 
unpredictable. Concepts of „risk‟ and „precaution‟ are deployed in various ways, 
for example analyses of governmentality indebted to Foucault;6 notions of 
precaution, very different in kind from the post-structuralist readings, derived from 
Just War theory;7 and a general sense of „better safe than sorry‟ underpinning 
preventive war strategies.8 None of these, the paper argues, capture the idea of 
the Precautionary Principle as used in other policy arenas and this is unfortunate 
for two reasons. Firstly, it confuses and undermines a useful tool for policy-
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making and policy analysis. Secondly, it serves to obscure a key challenge facing 
efforts to transpose precautionary policy-making from arenas like environmental 
policy to foreign policy: regulatory authority. 
Risk, Hazard and the Precautionary Principle 
Within arenas where the Precautionary Principle affects policy-making and 
analysis there are typically two elements to assessing a potential threat. First is 
hazard, which can be defined as „threats to people and the things they value‟.9 
Second is the concept of risk which is commonly defined as „the probability of an 
adverse future event multiplied by its magnitude‟.10 These are clearly linked – 
hazard is a necessary element of risk – but they tend to invite different types of 
analytical approach depending on the types of hazard that we are concerned with 
and the way in which we understand probability and magnitude. The debate on 
hazards and risks tends to fall under two distinct arguments: objective risk 
(science-based assessments of risk issues); and perceived risk, (risk as a 
cultural construct). Objective risk is a way of accurately measuring probability 
and magnitude by quantitative, reductive scientific procedures. During the 1980s, 
the Royal Society Report of the Study Group on Risk Assessment11 was, 
according to one risk management theorist, „the canonical exposition of risk 
policy‟.12 It was a scientific understanding which views risk „as the probability that 
a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a 
particular challenge. As a probability in the sense of statistical theory, risk obeys 
all the formal laws of combining probabilities‟.13  
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By contrast, the idea of perceived risk relies on cultural theory to describe a 
different version of risk. In a pioneering study, it was argued that society deals 
with risks in a culturally determined way, rather than being linked to objective risk 
measurement.14 In this approach to risk, which is incomprehensible to the 
scientific mind, the nature of the hazard and its probability are subjective. For 
example, as Adams noted, „slipping and falling on ice … is a game for young 
children, but a potentially fatal accident for an old person. And the probability of 
such an event is influenced both by a person‟s perception of the probability, and 
by whether they see it as fun or dangerous‟.15 The argument here is that social 
and cultural processes are at work that are not recognised under classic scientific 
investigative methods. On a societal level this approach to risk takes account of 
moral, political, economic and cultural factors, rather than simply objective risk 
measurement.16  
It is clear that there are uncertainties, ambiguities and sometimes ignorance in 
the process of attempting to define hazard and risk, with a view to ascertaining 
whether they are serious enough for some form of remedial action. As a result, 
there is scientific uncertainty that goes beyond the range of known, observable 
uncertainties that are recognised within the parameters of the system being 
researched. „Scientific knowledge gives prominence to a restricted agenda of 
defined uncertainties – ones that are tractable – leaving invisible a range of other 
uncertainties, especially about the boundary conditions of applicability of the 
existing framework of knowledge to new situations‟.17 In his seminal work, Wynne 
produced a typology to identify four different kinds of uncertainty: risk, 
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uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy. Risk is considered to be when we 
„know the odds‟ – that is, when we know the boundaries of the system under 
investigation, and are able to measure in some way the factors involved. 
Uncertainty represents knowledge of the parameters of a system‟s „limitations of 
observational and measurement techniques‟.18 Ignorance is that which is not 
known: for ignorance to be identified, new knowledge must be discoverable. The 
last category, indeterminacy, is the „recognition of the open-ended and 
conditional nature of knowledge and its embedded-ness in social contexts‟.19 
This fourth category recognises that social behaviour has to be included into the 
policy process, and this is a characteristic of the Precautionary Principle. It 
highlights the point that the „objective risk‟ approach implies that risk is always 
quantifiable, but in doing so it reduces scientific uncertainties to the notion that 
what is studied by experts is controlled and all ambiguities are solvable.20 
The development of the PP owes much to the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, where solutions were 
sought to find ways to conserve resources for future generations – the idea of 
sustainability. The PP has also become a guiding idea in European Union 
environmental policy.21 In recent years the precautionary principle has been used 
increasingly in areas other than sustainability issues, such as health screening 
and food related issues.22  
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration neatly demonstrates the main elements of the 
PP: „Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific 
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certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.‟23 
Despite the tensions and the difficulties of definition we can observe certain 
common characteristics within the Precautionary Principle.24 These would 
include: 
a. Acceptance of the limits of current knowledge on a given issue 
Governments clearly need the rationality that hard scientific evidence brings to 
the appraisal of risk because technological risk situations need sound scientific 
evidence to discover where the uncertainty is located. But they should also 
recognise the conditional nature of scientific knowledge and that the uncertainties 
often prevent sound recommendations; 
b. Openness to alternative solutions 
In the presence of ignorance and uncertainty, initiators of the problem under 
investigation should be prepared to look for alternative solutions to the safety of 
their products/systems; 
c. Proportionality of response  
Costs of actions to reduce or prevent hazards should not be disproportionate to 
likely benefits and should not aim for zero risk. The focus here is on the 
magnitude of the uncertainty. Rather than simply saying „there is some 
uncertainty therefore we should not proceed‟, this suggests that the level of 
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uncertainty should be assessed, and that the solution should be proportional to 
the problem;25 and,  
d. Reversing the ‘onus of persuasion’  
If the process of decision-making is to be fair, attention must be paid to the 
burden of persuasion – „which party has the burden of demonstrating or refuting 
a presumed fact‟.26 However, the idea that the burden of persuasion should be 
shifted to the proposers of innovation to convince other stakeholders that there is 
not a problem is quite a radical change as negatives are difficult to prove, and 
any formalising of the duty of care may stifle innovation and growth.  
Thus, the PP „is broadly characterised by the acceptance of the limits of scientific 
knowledge (science does not know all the answers); its openness to alternative 
solutions (other disciplines can contribute to the debate); the placing of the 
burden of proof on the initiators of technological change …; and the inclusion of 
the knowledge of wider society rather than that of science and industry alone‟.27 
These characteristics recognise that social behaviour has to be included in the 
policy process and therefore leans towards perceived risk, rather than objective 
risk measurement which are based on reductionist science alone. 
Risk and Hazard in International Relations 
The arena of international relations is one where debates about hazard and risk 
would, at first glance, appear to be particularly applicable. The subject has 
traditionally been dominated by questions, such as war, where these ideas would 
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seem to be central. Yet the usage of these terms is typically imprecise, at least in 
comparison with other policy areas.  
Major areas of foreign and defence policy – nuclear deterrence, for example – 
are all about manipulating probabilities and managing the most extreme sorts of 
hazards imaginable, such as global thermonuclear war, in order to achieve 
political goals, including, potentially, peace. Equally, technological innovation has 
had major effects on these sorts of debates and policies, and thus arms control 
negotiations have, for example, had to balance the effect innovation may have on 
highly valued goals in ways that do not bring about unacceptable costs. It is 
possible to read many of the classic nuclear arms control treaties via a lens of 
risk and the management of that risk in order to avoid the hazard of war with the 
potential to escalate to nuclear confrontation. Issues of ignorance and 
uncertainty, to borrow Wynne‟s ideas, also play their role. There is also a clear 
interaction here between objective and subjective risks, with the latter being far 
more important to understanding the politics of nuclear deterrence and arms 
control than the former. 
However, this apparent precision of hazard and risk, objective versus subjective 
risk and the clarity that formal risk assessment promises is difficult to obtain.28 
This might help explain why the idea of hazard is one that seems to appear very 
rarely in international relations and then in the context of formal modelling.29 We 
understand that the scientific certainty of an objective analysis of hazards and the 
modellable and statistically demonstrable risks that they may give rise to is rarely 
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attainable in international relations, and particularly in policy-making. Different 
political cultures and the beliefs and values of individual decision-makers may 
have significant effects on a willingness to take risks – risk appetite – and on the 
appreciation of the different risks that a situation may bring.  
It is therefore not altogether surprising that the issue of subjective risk has been 
picked up more extensively. The social dimension of risk has been heavily 
influenced by the ideas of Ulrich Beck in his influential sociological discussions of 
„Risk Society‟.30 Beck‟s principal focus is on the transformation of what IR would 
traditionally label „domestic‟ societies under the impacts of modernisation and 
technology and a distinctive move away from the social, political and economic 
processes that characterised the industrialising phase of modernity. Beck has 
developed this idea into the notion of „world risk society‟, drawing on the debates 
over globalisation and the idea of the transformation of international relations 
away from „Westphalian‟ models emphasising sovereignty, territory and ideas of 
state-based power and national interests.31 The creation, manipulation and 
management of risk is a key aspect of these sociological processes and creates 
social, political and economic environments in which opportunity, power and 
reward are intimately connected with the ability to take, share and exploit risks 
and where technologies of risk management, such as insurance and financial 
instruments, play a key role.32  
Risk and governmentality in IR 
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It is noteworthy, though, that many of the efforts to incorporate risk into IR depart 
in important ways from the idea of risk as Beck deployed it, bringing it instead 
into contact with key notions drawn from contemporary continental political 
theory, and in particular Foucault‟s notion of „governmentality‟.33 This allies the 
idea of risk to a broadly critical and post-structural perspective that analyses risk 
in terms of its contribution to the ability of governments to establish narratives 
supportive of apparatuses of discipline and control. In particular, important and 
interesting recent work has used risk as a tool for assessing the significance of 
the war on terror as a particularly distinctive form of this logic of governmentality, 
taking the idea of the catastrophic level of risk associated with major terrorist 
attacks as the basis for extending technologies, techniques and discourses of 
surveillance and intelligence gathering to unprecedented heights in the name of 
„precaution‟.34  
Thus the idea of precaution has begun to appear within this literature, too, 
although in a way that is at odds with the form to be found in the Precautionary 
Principle.35 In this Foucauldian mode of understanding risk, precaution is about 
the governmental logic underpinning more and more stringent and extensive 
forms of intelligence gathering and surveillance in support of the need to meet 
the unattainable political imperative of reducing the risk of catastrophic terrorist 
attack to zero.36 This is used to justify various coercive forms, from indefinite 
detention through extraordinary rendition, „enhanced interrogation‟ (i.e. torture), 
to preventive war. These practices demonstrate logics or create forms and 
spaces that connect the notion of risk to other crucial critical concepts in post-
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structuralist analyses, such as the idea of the exception and the work of both Carl 
Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben.37  
The virtues and insights of such forms of analysis are many and varied, and the 
use of the notion of risk within post-structural analyses of international relations is 
an important move in turning back on itself as a tool of critique an important 
element of the justification of exceptional, even unlawful, policies in the name of 
defraying or even defeating the risks posed by fundamentalist trans-national 
terrorism. Policy-making is revealed as reliant on an ostensibly impartial, even 
quasi-scientific, notion of risk and risk management that is neither of these 
things. Instead, this veneer hides a process of power accumulation and 
deployment that is changing the nature of surveillance and intelligence gathering 
in ways that undermine liberty and centralise control over permissible framings of 
political challenges.38 Policy-analysis deploying more conventional understanding 
of the Precautionary Principle are also subject to critique as a part of the problem 
because of the way that they buy into the idea that we can attain a degree of 
independent, even apolitical, knowledge about these risks that will enable us to 
devise effective strategies of risk management.  
This paper resists this post-structuralist move, however, in favour of considering 
how it is that the Precautionary Principle as it has been developed within 
environmental and public health fields is beginning to enter into the foreign and 
security policy fields as a policy-making tool and as a mode of policy analysis 
rather than as a rhetorical device or critical concept. This requires us to be more 
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sensitive to the way that critical uses of „risk‟ tend to emphasise the social 
construction and manipulation of the interplay between, in the case of major 
terrorist attacks, catastrophic risks at very low levels of probability to justify 
political actions. As the post-structuralists argue, we should be sceptical of efforts 
to deploy seemingly scientific ideas like hazard, risk and probability in defence of 
policies that accrue power to certain, already highly privileged, actors. However, 
that does not mean that we should assume that these analytical tools have been 
irretrievably coopted into the discourse of power and can no longer be used as 
analytical tools and in the policy-making process to good effect.  
As the language of risk becomes more widely deployed, especially in relation to 
terrorism, and as policy-makers stress the importance of addressing risks as 
early as possible,39 the need for precision and accuracy in how hazard and risk 
are conceptualised and deployed in policy debate grows. The distinctions noted 
earlier in Wynne‟s work of risk as something about which we can know the odds 
and indeterminacy or even ignorance, which demand different responses 
identifying the limits of our knowledge and the possibility of discovering new 
knowledge, are not closely observed in the post-structuralist approach. Indeed, 
risk is seen by some as characteristic of the unknowable or the purely 
imaginary.40 These, at least on the account of the Precautionary Principle 
developed at the start of this paper, are different types of knowledge situations 
and ought to require different types of responses. Does this separation represent 
a viable paradigm for how we might think effectively about risk, precaution and 
the Precautionary Principle in the policy-making and policy analysis context? 
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Precaution, humanitarian intervention and Just War 
One area where the idea of precaution has been explicitly invoked in policy-
making and analysis is humanitarian intervention, but here, too, there are 
problems of conceptual specificity that hamper the transfer of the PP from 
environmental and public health fields to foreign policy.41 For example, according 
to Ramesh Thakur, „Even when the just cause threshold of conscience-shocking 
loss of life or ethnic cleansing is crossed, intervention must be guided by the 
precautionary principles of right intention, last resort, proportional means and 
reasonable prospects‟.42 However, although Thakur makes reference to various 
threshold criteria that need to be countenanced by policymakers, he has, 
nevertheless, referred to plural precautionary principles. In other words, Thakur 
does not offer us a working definition of what a foreign policy based on the 
Precautionary Principle might be. Instead, he has forwarded what might be 
regarded as principles that are precautionary. They are also precautionary in the 
sense that we should exercise care in how we respond to an event – „conscience 
shocking loss of life or ethnic cleansing‟ – that has already occurred. This 
contrasts with those who see precaution as being about acting in advance of 
speculative or imagined harms.43  
A similar point arises in the ICISS report, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and 
Mohamed Sahnoun. According to this report, „criteria for military intervention for 
human protection purposes … can be succinctly summarised as right authority, 
just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable 
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prospects‟.44 Interestingly, further on in the same report the authors argue that 
right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects be 
classified as „other precautionary criteria‟.45 The authors then proceed to urge 
that the UN General Assembly „adopt a draft declaratory resolution embodying 
the basic principles of the responsibility to protect, and containing… an 
articulation of the precautionary principles (right intention, last resort, proportional 
means and reasonable prospect) that must be observed when military force is 
used for human protection purposes‟.46 Although the authors are clear in defining 
the precautionary criteria that would need to be satisfied in the event of military 
action being prosecuted for the purpose of protecting humans, it should not be 
forgotten that they refer to plural „precautionary principles‟. One is left to wonder 
whether, for example, „right intention‟ might be one individual and discrete 
precautionary principle compared to, for the sake of argument, the other 
precautionary principle of „last resort‟.  
This vagueness stems, we argue, from the lack of careful conceptualisation of 
risk in this area. There is a very general sense of the Hippocratic principle – first 
do no harm – at work, so that before acting to address humanitarian 
emergencies we should be careful to ensure that we do not make the situation 
worse. What is striking, however, is that this notion of precaution seemingly 
derives from a moral obligation on the part of those countenancing intervention 
that is the corollary of the basis upon which a putative right to intervene rests. 
The idea of the Precautionary Principle embodied in the Rio Declaration simply 
appears inapplicable in this context. The risks of serious or irreversible damage 
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are present, but lack of scientific certainty is simply unavoidable and we are 
thrown back on issues of political judgement which are significantly influenced by 
moral claims that are inescapable outside the sort of scientific assessment and 
testing regime that may be applicable in environmental policy. The post-
structuralist notion of risk as indeterminate and a mechanism for controlling the 
future through manipulating political subjectivity is also absent in the face of 
events that have already occurred and demand a political response.47  
The existence of cosmopolitan moral obligations owed across sovereign 
boundaries to fellow human beings undergoing grave harms at the hands of, or 
as a result of the failure of, their government animates the humanitarian 
intervention debate.48 The argument of Responsibility to Protect is that those 
obligations can, in extreme circumstances, justify the use of coercive military 
might to mitigate or halt those harms. The argument most typically used in 
international relations against such action – that it infringes on the sovereignty of 
the state that is subject to intervention – is overruled because that claim to 
sovereignty is seen to be derivative from the state‟s ability to protect and promote 
the prior rights of its citizens. Where a state and its government are unable or 
unwilling to fulfil this obligation, the claim to sovereignty lapses. Indeed, the act of 
intervention may be seen as being restorative of sovereignty because the 
ultimate aim should be the restitution of a political authority that can and will 
uphold citizens‟ rights.49 This is not just a prudential move in the name of the 
international order or the enhancing of security, it is an importantly moral 
obligation that ought to be fulfilled. Because of both the unpredictability of the 
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outcomes of the use of armed force and the moral seriousness of fighting and 
killing in the name of protecting lives and rights then measures should always be 
taken to try to prevent such circumstances occurring in the first place and all 
reasonable alternative courses of action should be explored.  
These are rarely circumstances, and these are not analytical questions, which 
lend themselves to objective, statistical analysis based on clear scientific 
evidence. The idea of risk as a significantly social phenomenon is stretched 
further in this usage to incorporate not just social understandings of the 
significance of certain risks to things that society values, but also ideas of 
universal moral hazards – that we should value the lives of other human beings 
elsewhere in the world and respond to threats to those lives. We must also 
respond to crises that threaten the moral value attached to the sovereign state, 
conceptualised in Responsibility to Protect as the best available means for the 
protection and promotion of human rights.  
The deployment of moral argument and the derivation of these „precautionary 
principles‟ from the tradition of Just War theory is highly significant. It is difficult, 
and potentially intellectually dangerous, to aim at generalisation about a tradition 
of thought as diverse and dynamic as that of Just War, but the use of principles 
like proportionality, just cause, reasonable prospects, right intention and 
legitimate authority – classic jus ad bellum principles – in this way suggests an 
effort to transfer potential bases for normative enquiry into empirical principles for 
assessing policy options.50 Just War theory does not lend itself to the kind of „tick 
 18 
the box‟ approach to moral assessment implied by the use of precautionary 
principles by Thakur or Evans and Sahnoun. The idea of a knowledge system 
with well-understood boundaries, processes and outcomes enabling us to know 
the risks we are taking is not one that many would apply to humanitarian 
intervention. The uncertainty involved in these principles goes much further than 
uncertainty about whether some particular interpretation of how they might apply 
in a given set of circumstances is fulfilled or not.51 Instead, what we are reminded 
of here is the moral significance of political action and the perennial need for 
moral enquiry into the use made of lethal organised violence in the name of a 
greater good of some kind, whether that be order, justice, humanitarianism, 
human rights or one of several other possible candidates.  
The Precautionary Principle as deployed in environmental policy is of a different 
kind than these precautionary principles. It offers an approach to policy-making 
and analysis that is useful in these sorts of circumstances because it urges us 
not to demand certainty before we act and to acknowledge the need for 
judgement and the taking of political responsibility in the face of competing 
predictions of the future outcomes of policy choices. It is not, though, of great 
help in answering profound moral questions and that should be acknowledged. 
Differences between the PP and existing ideas: prevention and pre-emption  
Therefore, when it comes to this field, the literature assessing the Precautionary 
Principle in the specific sense is limited, although some work is being done.52 In 
addition, this wider literature does not seem to adequately distinguish between 
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precaution and prevention. The distinction between the two is that: „precaution 
concerns potential or hypothetical hazards (uncertainty) whereas prevention 
deals with known and recognised risks‟.53 It is hypothetical hazard that tends to 
be most prominent in the post-structuralist literature, for example. Moreover, 
elements of precaution are arguably increasingly visible in foreign policy. Terms 
such as prevention, pre-emption and precaution need careful examination to 
avoid confusion. Kegley and Raymond, for example, remind us, „preventive 
military attack entails the use of force to eliminate any possible future strike, even 
where there is no reason to believe that aggression is planned or the capability to 
launch such an attack is operational‟.54 In other words, „preventive war is based 
on the concept that war is inevitable, and that it is better to fight now while the 
costs are low rather than later when the costs are high‟.55 Therefore, it „might be 
argued that preventive war arises „from states‟ inability to trust each other to keep 
to a bargain‟.56  
Some literature claims the Precautionary Principle provided an important element 
of US defence strategy under George W. Bush.57 Such arguments in this 
literature do not differentiate sufficiently between the PP and the preventive 
principle. The difference is that the PP is triggered by uncertainty as to the facts 
of the issue in hand, while prevention deals with purportedly known situations: 
there is no apparent doubt as the desires and intentions of al Qaeda, only its 
capabilities. On the other hand, pre-emption „is nothing more than a quick draw. 
Upon detecting evidence that an opponent is about to attack, one beats the 
opponent to the punch and attacks first to blunt the impending strike‟.58 An 
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example of this strategy would by the Israeli offensive in the 1967 Six Day War, 
where Israeli intelligence detected an existential threat from its neighbours and 
landed the first blow.59 Nevertheless, a pre-emptive strike is not precautionary as 
it relates to a danger where the probability is certain, rather than being a matter 
of debate and dispute.  
In a BBC TV documentary, the writer and producer Adam Curtis examined the 
war on terror policies of the US and British Governments over recent decades.60 
The documentary examined the threat from organised terror networks and asked 
whether they are an illusion. Curtis argued that there is a shift from evidence-
based „what is‟ decision-making to a speculative, imaginary „what if‟, or worst-
case scenario decision-making.61 Towards the end of the programme Curtis 
quotes the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, as stating that the politician‟s 
role in this new threat was to look into the future and imagine the worst that might 
happen and then act ahead of time to prevent it.62 Curtis then posed the idea that 
this statement means the Prime Minister was embracing the Precautionary 
Principle. It may be that precaution is actually a better characterisation of what 
the US government styles as „pre-emption‟, but which most IR scholars see as 
preventive war, given the uncertainties involved. 
However, the level of those uncertainties is a very significant issue. In a famous 
example of taking precautionary thinking to its logical extremes, former US Vice-
President Dick Cheney propounded the „1% doctrine‟ – the idea that if there was 
a 1% chance that Iran could acquire a nuclear weapons capability the US should 
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act as though it were a certainty.63 This is an example of precautionary thinking, 
certainly, but it is also an example of an exceptional lack of analytical 
sophistication. Suggesting that US policy on a crucial international issue should 
be based on a marginal possibility, itself linking through to other marginal 
possibilities to do with the uses that Iran might make of such a capability and that 
Iran‟s behaviour might not be influenced by a whole range of deterrent strategies, 
is misguided at best. The Precautionary Principle is not about the elimination of 
risk, as Cheney‟s doctrine appears to be, or Blair‟s account of the changing 
nature of political responsibility might suggest. It is also easy to see how 
arguments like Cheney‟s or Blair‟s also feed into the post-structural, 
governmentality analysis of the use of the language of risk, too. Instead, 
however, the Precautionary Principle is about the acceptance and management 
of risk. It is impossible to eliminate risk, but there needs to be, in policy-making 
and analysis, a balance of judgements about what are and are not acceptable 
risks, linked to the value of the putative outcomes of accepting certain risks and 
in awareness of the limitations of knowledge. The view that the elimination of the 
possibility of highly unlikely but catastrophic risks, such as a nuclear attack by a 
terrorist organisation in a major city, is both an overwhelming political duty that 
can justify any policy promulgated and prosecuted in its name and the 
paradigmatic example of risk-based analysis and the deployment of the 
Precautionary Principle is seriously mistaken. The need for awareness of the 
distinction between precaution in the face of hypothetical hazard and radical 
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indeterminacy and the Precautionary Principle in the face of at least some 
reliable knowledge of the level of risk is an important if easily overlooked one. 
The „1% doctrine‟ or other examples of extreme „better safe than sorry‟ thinking 
reiterate the point that the idea of the Precautionary Principle tends to be used 
with a lack of specificity in international relations. However, an additional issue 
that the 1% doctrine highlights is the question of who decides that a risk is at the 
level of 1%, 10% or 99.9%, beyond which we leave precaution behind and move 
into the realms of preventing that which is a known outcome in absence of 
countervailing measures? Key questions remain unresolved about who has the 
authority to judge the level of risk and whether or not to invoke the Precautionary 
Principle. Here, we argue, there is a significant challenge that particularly affects 
efforts to operationalise the Precautionary Principle as a foreign policy making 
tool.  
The Precautionary Principle and the Challenge of International 
Authority: Invading Iraq 
Appealing to the Precautionary Principle is a complex and potentially highly 
controversial task. The most significant challenge facing translating this principle 
to making and analysing foreign policy is the authority structures that are typically 
presumed in discussions of the Precautionary Principle and those at work in the 
arena of international politics. This is not to appeal to some simplistic „domestic 
politics equals hierarchy‟ versus „international politics equals anarchy‟ dichotomy, 
but it is to note that the Precautionary Principle generally adopts an expectation 
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about authority structures that assumes there is consensus, or even formal and 
institutionalised mechanisms, for determining where decision-making authority 
lies. Thus within the public health and environmental contexts, especially within 
Europe, governmental or EU bodies have established the rules about when the 
Precautionary Principle ought to be applied and can adjudicate on disputes 
between those pressing for its application and those preferring alternative 
approaches, such as „sound science‟.  
These lines of authority are far less clear in the international arena, at least 
outside of the European Union. Thus debates about the precautionary principle 
as a way of formulating, presenting and assessing foreign policy decisions face 
some important challenges in terms of fundamental questions about the 
regulatory environment. This is illustrated by two existing analyses of the 
decision-making in the run up to the 2003 Iraq invasion. McLean and Patterson 
argue that the Precautionary Principle can be deployed as a way to understand 
the resistance to the invasion being led by the French and German governments 
in UN Security Council debates. The US, as the initiator of a new technique – 
„preventive war‟ – for managing a complex nexus of policy-problems, faced the 
need to persuade the sceptics on the Council of the probable safety and 
effectiveness of their proposed course of action. However, Stern and Wiener see 
the US government as being the proponent of a policy appealing to the 
Precautionary Principle, seeing the UN as an obstacle to the deployment of this 
principle and as peripheral to the authority the Bush administration was aiming to 
deploy.64 Here the regulatory authority is also the policy initiator, with the role of 
 24 
precaution and the PP much more in line with the way risk has tended to be used 
in IR and where being seen to take early and effective action in the face of 
potentially catastrophic hazard in the absence of certainty is centre-stage. Issues 
of supra-national regulatory authority, sources of information – such as the UN 
weapons inspection teams – and the risks to the viability of these systems are 
swept away by a presumed national security imperative that trumps all other 
perspectives. This is perhaps hardly surprising given the prominence and 
influence of so-called „new sovereigntist‟ thinking on the Bush Administration at 
that time, with its deep distrust and legal rejection of any claims to authority over 
the United States by extra-Constitutional bodies, such as the UN, ICC and even 
the WTO.65 These diametrically opposed views highlight the issue of perspective 
on authoritative regulatory institutions and the opportunity for contestation over 
this question within international relations, an opportunity that, although not 
absent, is less extensive within the state or within highly institutionalised 
international environments like the EU.  
Additionally, the centrality of foreign and defence policy to debates about 
sovereignty, and the perception that absolute control over such matters are at the 
very heart of traditional notions of sovereignty exacerbates this tension. For 
example, Stern and Wiener frame their discussion on the basis that authority lies 
with the United States government as the sovereign authority.66 Seeing the UN 
Security Council as the „regulatory authority‟ pushes towards the idea of the 
Precautionary Principle mitigating against preventive war because of the way that 
many members of the Council opposed the innovative policy being pushed by the 
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United States and United Kingdom. The risk being considered was therefore the 
risk associated with a policy proposal that departed from established, even 
legally enshrined, notions about the legitimacy of the recourse to war, including 
the rejection of preventive war, and some of the most deeply entrenched 
standards of international politics, such as the non-intervention norm. The risk 
involved thus stemmed from the actions of the US and UK and the justifications 
they were offering. For Stern and Wiener, the issue is the risk supposedly, if 
erroneously, posed by Iraq and the need argued for by the US to take steps to 
protect both US national security and wider issues of regional and global 
security.67  
The question of political framing becomes of immense importance in interpreting 
and applying the Precautionary Principle to the formulation, presentation and 
analysis of foreign and security policy. The challenge of knowing the level of risk 
associated with particular hazards, such as the acquisition by Iraq of weapons of 
mass destruction, and the extent, reliability and presentation of that knowledge 
thus become acute in highly contested circumstances such as these when the 
deployment of massive military force is at stake. An appreciation for Wynne‟s 
different types of uncertainty and the potential contribution they could have made 
to generating more precise and careful debate was sadly lacking amongst policy-
makers, perhaps not surprisingly, but often, it would seem, amongst analysts too. 
Knowing the difference between „risk‟ and „uncertainty‟ or „ignorance‟ could have 
informed and improved public debate in significant ways, although expecting 
governments to be open about their levels of uncertainty and ignorance may be 
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asking rather more than is politically plausible. Nevertheless, this distinction does 
help to highlight how it is that the usage of „risk‟ in international relations is 
covering a multitude of finer distinctions and different political and analytical 
agendas that, ideally, require clarification, separation and an established basis 
for authoritative adjudication.  
The Precautionary Principle and the Challenge of Authority: the role 
of non-governmental authorities 
One way in which the problem of governments being generally unwilling to call 
time on policies they have frequently initiated and institutionalised is partially 
overcome by establishing a role for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
This has become a common feature of policy-making based on the Precautionary 
Principle. There are ways in which non-governmental actors have been able to 
secure a voice in the process that must be considered and taken into account by 
those who ultimately take the decisions. This has served to diversify the range of 
voices heard, broaden the perspectives on a particular policy challenge and 
reduce the risks of overly narrow „expert‟ opinion becoming entrenched and 
privileged in ways that can close-down debate and close-off potentially important 
sources of evidence.68  
Outside of foreign policy there have been some notable moves in this direction. 
For example, the UK government‟s review of the regulatory framework and the 
guidelines for scientific advice lays down new definitions of what is meant by the 
term „expert‟ and what constitutes „relevant‟ advice to government.69 This means 
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expert sources are taken to include not only scientists but also public research 
bodies, consumer and other stakeholder groups, and lay membership of 
government committees. Similarly, the Phillips‟ Report on the UK‟s BSE outbreak 
stressed the need for government departments to insure that recruitment to 
membership of expert committees should be based on an expanded definition of 
who is an expert, and urges members of committees themselves to identify 
clearly and precisely their remit, and for advice itself to be honest about 
uncertainties.70 And in the EU, the Commission‟s policy document on the PP 
outlines its approach to the dilemma of balancing the rights of individuals, 
industry and the need to reduce risks to the environment, human and animal 
health.71 Thus a more socially inclusive approach to environmental decision-
making is owed to a move towards a commitment to the concept of precaution. 
It is misleading to suggest, as many critics do, that the PP simply means that 
business and science cannot innovate unless their proposals or discoveries 
satisfy a body of people who are firm defenders of the status quo. Rather, 
evidence of a link between a damaging effect and an activity must have been 
noticed by someone, or some scientific or governmental body to trigger an 
investigation under the PP. An example of this in the early years of the twentieth 
century was the reports of several factory inspectors of the effects of asbestos on 
workers in those factories. This led to asbestos being identified as toxic to 
workers and eventually to other substances being used.72 In reality what happens 
is that informal early warning systems exist, such as the factory inspectors in the 
above example, and environmental NGOs and pressure groups who can act as 
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competent observers and raise instances of emerging problems. These 
competent observers do not produce absolute „proof beyond reasonable doubt‟ 
but their observations/objections are enough to trigger a decision to evoke the 
PP. Therefore, the idea that those who innovate and invent are subject to a veto 
by a group of people who are obsessively attached to an absolute version of the 
PP is not what the PP is about. It bears repeating that precaution and prevention 
are not synonymous: the PP is triggered by uncertainty as to the facts of the 
issue in question, while prevention deals with known situations. 
There are few democracies that do not sport a vibrant range of think-tanks, public 
affairs organisations and academics willing and able to play such a role within a 
policy-making framework indebted to the Precautionary Principle. Different 
political systems may, though, be less or more receptive to formalising the PP 
into their policy practices. This has been the experience in the environmental 
arena. For example, the Precautionary Principle has varying degrees of 
legitimacy amongst civil society groups within the US, UK, Germany and France. 
The academic literature suggests that the PP is more accepted in the continental 
European states than it is in the UK or US73 although recent research has argued 
that this characterisation is stereotypical.74 Some commentators have suggested 
that this might be due to the latter countries‟ preference towards minimal state 
intervention in the economy.75 However, general support for the PP within wider 
society does not mean government will accept it in policymaking or, even where 
it does, that more than lip-service will be paid on individual issues. The general 
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assumption that the PP is more influential in France and Germany than the US or 
UK is usually in relation to areas of „low politics‟ such as environmental policy.76  
Other commentators argue that there is a clear divide between the US and EU in 
international regulation for environmental protection purposes. The US objects to 
the PP because, it is argued, the principle‟s ambiguity lends itself to misuse as a 
pretext for protectionism. The EU prefers a formalised idea of precaution, 
providing a legal basis for regulatory decision-making which recognises scientific 
uncertainties and monitors for change.77 Therefore, it would appear that a 
research agenda is currently developing that examines the extent to which the 
idea of the PP is amenable to national governments as an idea and a way to 
frame, direct and validate social learning. It would appear that the PP would be 
more amenable to governments in countries such as Germany or France, and 
less so to governments within the US or UK, given how these states view the PP 
in environmental politics. We might speculate that the latter governments might 
be more reluctant to embrace the PP through their general reticence to pool 
sovereignty within international organisations (the United Nations in terms of the 
US, and the European Union in terms of the UK). In comparison, it could be 
argued that issues of sovereignty are less important to the French and Germans.  
Conclusions 
The language of hazard, risk, prevention and precaution has never been absent 
from foreign policy making or analysis, but it does seem to have become more 
prevalent in recent years, particularly since 2001. Whether concerned with critical 
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investigations into the role of risk in strategies of governmentality or the need for 
ethical caution in the face of humanitarian crisis, the necessity of responding to 
uncertainty is unavoidable. It is also, though, hardly novel, but what marks out 
these recent moves is the sense of an organised effort to channel policy-making 
and analysis down certain routes to create structure and direction. The use of the 
Precautionary Principle in the environmental field has appeal in this regard, 
because of the way that it established principles upon which decision-making in 
the face of uncertainty can be based. However, as this paper has tried to show, 
the uncertainties in the field of foreign policy are of a different sort and there are 
distinctive challenges.  
The tension between objective and subjective risk is both acute – the problem of 
(mis)perception is well known in international relations – and open to 
manipulation, as stressed in post-structural analyses. The moral significance of 
action stressed in the use of precautionary principles in Responsibility to Protect 
adds to this problem. The lack of scientific certainty, statistically valid analyses 
and established mechanisms for testing, evaluating and reviewing data all 
bedevil such debates. Deploying the Precautionary Principle in foreign and 
security policy-making is not a straightforward task.  
The PP is, though, a very useful analytical tool for framing, discussing and 
critiquing the kinds of precautionary claims that are increasingly made in foreign 
policy arenas such as the „war on terror‟ and humanitarian intervention. As ideas 
of risk are increasingly appealed to by policy-makers and scholars, the PP offers 
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a valuable counter-point to the looseness of public political debate and the 
emphasis on discourse and critique emphasised by those reading risk through 
post-structuralist lenses. Policy making and policy analysis in environmental and 
public health sectors have benefited from this approach, suggesting a valuable 
contribution can also be made, at least in analytical terms, in international 
relations.  
 32 
References 
 
* The authors would like to thank participants in the panel at the 49th ISA 
Convention, San Francisco, where an earlier draft of this paper was presented 
for their comments. In particular, thanks are due to Stefan Elbe who acted as 
discussant. Craig McLean and John Williams would like to acknowledge the 
financial support offered by the British Academy for their attendance at the 
Convention. Thanks are also due to the two anonymous referees for their 
insightful and constructive criticism. Errors and shortcomings remain, of course, 
our responsibility. 
1 Available at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/pdf/nss02.pdf and 
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2628/nss2006.pdf It is striking that 
among the first actions of the Obama Administration was the removal of all links 
to these documents from the White House website.  
2 E.g. Karen J Greenberg (ed), The Torture Debate in America, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
3 E.g. Mark Salter, „Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification, and Aviation 
Security‟, Security Dialogue 39(2-3), 2008, p. 255; Rosalyn Diprose et al, 
„Governing the Future: the Paradigm of Prudence in Political Technologies of 
Risk Management‟, Security Dialogue 39(2-3), 2008, p. 269. 
4 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, p. 12, 18. 
5 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, p. 18. 
 33 
 
6 E.g see the special issue of Security Dialogue 39(2-3), 2008 devoted to 
„Security, Technologies of Risk and the Political‟. 
7 E.g. Ramesh Thakur, „The Responsibility to Protect and the War on Saddam 
Hussein‟, in Ramesh Thakur, and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.) The Iraq 
Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges, 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006). 
8 This is discussed later in the paper with reference to the idea of „the 1% 
doctrine‟. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: deep inside America’s pursuit 
of its enemies since 9/11, (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 
9 Susan L. Cutter, Living with Risk: the geography of technological hazards, 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1993), p. 2. 
10 John Adams, Risk, (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 69. 
11 Royal Society, Risk Assessment: A Study Group Report, (London: Royal; 
Society, 1983).  
12 Andy Stirling, „Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution: Some Instrumental 
Implications from the Social Sciences‟, in Frans Berkhout, Melissa Leach and Ian 
Scoones, Negotiating Environmental Change: New Perspectives from Social 
Science, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003), p. 48. 
13 Adams, Risk, p. 8. 
14 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavski, Risk and Culture: an essay on the 
selection of technological and Environmental Dangers, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982). 
15 Adams, Risk, p. 9. 
 34 
 
16 Cutter, Living With Risk, p. 22. 
17 Brian Wynne, „Uncertainty, and Environmental Learning: reconceiving science 
and policy in the preventive paradigm.‟ Global Environmental Change, June 
1992, p. 115. 
18 L. Salter, Williams Leiss and Edwin Levy, Mandated Science: Science and 
Scientists in the Making of Standards, (Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1988), p. 201.  
19 J. Hunt, „The Social Construction of Precaution, in Timothy O‟Riordan and 
James Cameron (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, (London: 
Earthscan, 1994), p. 117. 
20 Alan Patterson, Risk Regulations and Scientific Expertise in the United 
Kingdom, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2009, p. 75.  
21 Commission of the European Communities (2000) Communication from the 
Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 Final, Brussels. 
22 Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel A. Tickner (eds.), Protecting Public Health 
and the Environment: Implementing the precautionary principle, (Washington DC: 
Island Press, 1999) and Poul Harremoes, David Gee, Malcolm MacGarvin, Andy 
Stirling Jane Keys and Brian Wynne, The Precautionary Principle in the 20th 
Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings, (London: Earthscan, 2002). 
23 United Nations (UN), Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, volume 1: Resolutions Adopted by the 
Conference, (New York: United Nations, 1993). Emphasis added. 
 35 
 
24 Alan Patterson and Craig McLean, „The Management of Risk in Foreign and 
Defence Policy: the Precautionary Principle and Decisions on War‟, Medicine, 
Conflict and Survival, 24(1), 2008, pp. 43-59. 
25 Craig McLean and Alan Patterson, „A Precautionary Approach to Foreign 
Policy: a Preliminary Analysis of Tony Blair‟s Speeches on Iraq‟, British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations, 8(3), 2006, p. 354. 
26 Nicholas A. Ashford, „A Conceptual Framework for the use of the 
Precautionary Principle in Law‟, in Raffensperger and Tickner (eds), Protecting 
Public Health, p. 204 
27 McLean and Patterson, „Precautionary Approach‟, p. 353. 
28 The illusion of quantitative precision is a key element of Mark Salter‟s critique 
of the use of risk management in aviation security. See Salter, „Imagining 
Numbers‟. 
29 E.g. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Christopher Zorn, „Nonproportional 
Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations‟, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 47(1), 2003, pp. 33-53. 
30 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: towards a new modernity, (London: Sage, 1992). 
31 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). 
32 For a recent example that takes Beck as one of its key intellectual figures see 
Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, „Terrorism, Risk and International Security: 
the perils of asking “What If?”‟, Security Dialogue 39(2-3), 2008. 
33 E.g. Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, „Governing Terrorism Through 
Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future‟, European Journal of 
 36 
 
International Relations, 13(1), 2007, especially pp. 90-7. Foucault is also a key 
figure for almost all of the contributors to the 2008 Special Edition of Security 
Dialogue on „Security, Technologies of Risk and the Political‟. 
34 Aradau and Van Munster, „Governing Terrorism‟, pp. 97-107. 
35 E.g. Salter, „Imagining Numbers‟, p. 255; Aradau and Van Munster „Governing 
Terrorism‟, pp. 102-107. 
36 Aradau and Van Munster, „Governing Terrorism‟. 
37 E.g. Claudia Aradau, „Law Transformed: Guantanamo and the „Other‟ 
Exception‟, Third World Quarterly, 28(3), 2007, pp. 489-501 and Stuart Elden, 
„Terror and Territory‟, Antipode, 39(5), 2007, pp. 821-45. 
38 E.g. Marieke De Goede, „Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post 9/11 
Security Imagination‟, Security Dialogue 39(2-3), 2008. 
39 E.g. NSC (National Security Council), The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ (28.4.08), 
pp. 8, 12. 
40 E.g. De Goede, „Beyond Risk‟ and Mythen and Walklate, „Terrorism, Risk and 
International Security‟. 
41 E.g. Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, Gisele Côté-Harper, Lee Hamilton, 
Michael Ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus Naumann, Cyril Ramaphosa, Fidel 
Ramos, Cornelio Sommaruga, Eduardo Stein and Ramesh Thakur, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
2001); Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, „Preventive War and 
 37 
 
Permissive Normative Order‟, International Studies Perspectives, 4, 2003, 
pp.385-394; and Ramesh Thakur, „The Responsibility to Protect and the War on 
Saddam Hussein‟, in Ramesh Thakur, and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.) The 
Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges, 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006).  
42 Thakur, „The Responsibility to Protect and the War on Saddam Hussein‟, p. 
473. 
43 E.g. De Goede, „Beyond Risk‟. 
44 Evans et al, Responsibility to Protect, p. 32. 
45 Evans et al, Responsibility to Protect, pp. 35-7. 
46 Evans et al, Responsibility to Protect, p. 74. 
47 E.g. Diprose et al „Governing the Future‟. 
48 The literature on humanitarian intervention is vast. For a classic and still 
influential statement that rests upon cosmopolitan principles see Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian intervention in international society, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
49 Evans et al, Responsibility to Protect, p. ?? 
50 A good recent survey of the development of Just War theory comes in Alex 
Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, Cambridge: Polity, 2006. A useful 
collection of selected readings covering 1500 years of Just War theorising is 
Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse and Endre Begby (eds), The Ethics of War: 
Classic and contemporary readings, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 
 38 
 
51 The idea of Just War theory as being a necessarily contextual approach 
requiring a form of analysis and argument that is indebted to the casuistical 
tradition from which it arguable emerges is defended in various accounts of the 
tradition. Useful examples of this include, Oliver O‟Donovan, The Just War 
Revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Nicholas J. Rengger, 
„On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century, International Affairs, 78 
(2), 2002. 
52 Jonathan B. Wiener, „Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the 
Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems‟, Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law, 13(4), 2003, pp. 207-262; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Stern and Wiener, „Precaution Against Terrorism‟; 
Aradau and Van Munster, „Governing Terrorism‟. 
53 Olivier Godard, The Precautionary Principle. Between Social Norms and 
Economic Constructs, (Paris: Laboratoire D‟Econometrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 
2005), p. 5. 
54 Kegley and Raymond, „Preventive War‟, p. 388. 
55 James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, „US Policy on Preventive War and Pre-
Emption‟, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2003, p. 116. 
56 James D. Fearon, „Rationalist Explanations for War‟, International 
Organization, 49(3), 1995, p. 406. 
57 Stern and Wiener, „Precaution Against Terrorism‟. 
58 Wirtz and Russel, „US Policy‟, p. 116. 
 39 
 
59 Kegley and Raymond, „Preventive War‟, p. 388. 
60 BBC Documentary, „The Power of Nightmares‟, broadcast 11/03/04, BBC 2, 
transcript from Information Clearing House, 
http://www.informationcleraringhouse.info/video1040.htm (accessed 11/02/05). 
61 See also Mythen and Walklate, „Terrorism, Risk and International Security‟. 
62 BBC, „Power of Nightmares‟. 
63 Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine 
64 Jessica Stern and Jonathan B. Wiener, „Precaution Against Terrorism‟, 
Journal of Risk Research, 9(4), 2006, pp. 393-447. 
65 E.g. Peter J. Spiro, „The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its 
False Prophets‟, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2000. 
66 Stern and Wiener, „Precaution Against Terrorism‟. 
67 Stern and Wiener, „Precaution Against Terrorism‟. 
68 E.g. Salter, „Imagining Numbers‟, pp. 255-61. 
69 Office of Science and Technology (2000) Guidelines 2000: Scientific Advice 
and Policy-Making, DTI: http://www.berr.gov.uk/dius/science/science-in-
govt/advice-policy-making/guidelines/page15432.html (accessed 25.4.08). 
70 Lynn Frewer and Brian Salter, „Public attitudes, scientific advice and the 
politics of regulatory policy: the case of BSE‟, Science and Public Policy, 29(2), 
2002, p. 141. BSE (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy) is a cattle disease 
particularly prevalent in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The discovery 
of its transmissability to human beings through eating infected meat products 
 40 
 
created a major public health scare that led to the slaughter of millions of cattle 
and a ban on UK beef exports that seriously damaged the agricultural economy. 
71 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the 
Commission on the Precautionary Principle. 
72 David Gee and Morris Greenberg, „Asbestos: from “magic” to malevolent 
mineral‟, in Harremoes et al, The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century, p. 
50. 
73 A. Konig, „Towards a Common Understanding of the Precautionary Principle?‟ 
Foreign Policy Bulletin, 12(1/2), 2000. O‟Riordan and Cameron (eds), Interpreting 
the Precautionary Principle. 
74 Jonathan B. Wiener, „Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the 
Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems‟ Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, 13(4), 2003, pp. 207-262. 
75 Mike Feintuck, „Precautionary Maybe, but What‟s the Principle? The 
Precautionary Principle, the Regulation of Risk, and the Public Domain‟ Journal 
of Law and Society, 32(3), 2005, pp. 371-398. 
76 Feintuck, „Precautionary Maybe‟; Harremoes et al (eds), The Precautionary 
Principle; O‟Riordan and Cameron (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle.  
77 Konig, „Towards a Common Understanding‟. 
